표준특허란 놈에 대해.
- 작성일
- 12-08-25 13:30
포스너 판사가 쓴 판결문에서 FRAND 에 대한 언급에 대해 플로리안 뮬러가 찬성하면서 쓴 내용인데 한 번 읽어볼 만 합니다.
뮬러라는 사람이 마소한테 돈받고 뭘 했다던가 별 전문가도 아니라던가 등등 말이 많긴 하지만
제가 보기엔 이사람만큼 해설 잘해주는 사람도 없어서 적당히 걸러 들으시면 될 것 같네요.
애플 삼성 간 유럽에서의 법정 공방에서 적어도 국내 커뮤니티들의 반응보다는 이사람 예측이 수십배 정확하더라고요.
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/06/judge-posners-dismissal-of-two-way.html
The above paragraph is highly important. In debates over FRAND, many people fail to make the necessary distinction between the pre-standard-setting value of a patent and the value of standardization itself. SEP holders obviously like to argue that what they sell is a license to operate in a market: without a license, the phone won't dial into a network. But that value is a separate story from the intrinsic value of the innovation that a patent represents. A patent doesn't have to represent a particularly impressive innovation to be included in a standard. It's all just a bargaining process. The patent becomes powerful because of the collective market share of the companies engaged in standard-setting. That's the power of a cartel, not the power of innovation.
Judge Posner accurately refers to the differential between the value of a standard and the value of a patent contributed to it as "the hold-up value".
In my observation, standard-essential patents are, on average, not more but actually less of an innovative achievement than other patents. Most of those patents would have a commercial value of zero, or next to zero, if they weren't included in a standard. For example, they cover simple countdown algorithms, some of an infinity of encryption algorithms, etc. There are countless workarounds, but those workarounds cease to be available once the patented technique has become a mandatory part of a standard. If the standard prescribes only one way to encrypt data or to count down the number of packets to transmit, the availability of other ways to solve the same technical "problems" becomes irrelevant.
If patent holders were allowed to charge based on the value of standard-setting, they would unduly enrich themselves just because they were part of a standard-setting cartel.
번역하기 귀찮아서 그냥 카피앤페이스트했습니다.. 죄송합니다.
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/06/judge-posners-dismissal-of-two-way.html
The above paragraph is highly important. In debates over FRAND, many people fail to make the necessary distinction between the pre-standard-setting value of a patent and the value of standardization itself. SEP holders obviously like to argue that what they sell is a license to operate in a market: without a license, the phone won't dial into a network. But that value is a separate story from the intrinsic value of the innovation that a patent represents. A patent doesn't have to represent a particularly impressive innovation to be included in a standard. It's all just a bargaining process. The patent becomes powerful because of the collective market share of the companies engaged in standard-setting. That's the power of a cartel, not the power of innovation.
Judge Posner accurately refers to the differential between the value of a standard and the value of a patent contributed to it as "the hold-up value".
In my observation, standard-essential patents are, on average, not more but actually less of an innovative achievement than other patents. Most of those patents would have a commercial value of zero, or next to zero, if they weren't included in a standard. For example, they cover simple countdown algorithms, some of an infinity of encryption algorithms, etc. There are countless workarounds, but those workarounds cease to be available once the patented technique has become a mandatory part of a standard. If the standard prescribes only one way to encrypt data or to count down the number of packets to transmit, the availability of other ways to solve the same technical "problems" becomes irrelevant.
If patent holders were allowed to charge based on the value of standard-setting, they would unduly enrich themselves just because they were part of a standard-setting cartel.
번역하기 귀찮아서 그냥 카피앤페이스트했습니다.. 죄송합니다.
한줄 요약하면, 표준이라는 것 자체가 대부분은 기술의 우위를 바탕으로 설정되는 게 아니라 카르텔의 강제력을 바탕으로 설정되는 것이란 얘기죠. 대부분의 표준특허는 그것이 혁신적 기술이라서가 아니라 그것이 '표준'으로 선정되어서 우회가 불가능한 것이기 때문에 위력을 갖는다고 합니다. 물론 그 자체로 혁신적인 표준특허도 많이 있겠지만요.
왜 FRAND 남용을 일견 엉뚱해 보이는 독점 이슈로 다루는가 하는 이유입니다.
이번 판결은 정확히 말하면 아직 판결도 나지 않은 거고 앞으로 많은 얘기가 나오겠지만
그리고 베팍에 실제로 표준특허 관련 기술을 다루시는 분도 있으실지 몰라서 좀 조심스럽지만 법적인 측면에서의 해석은 이정도가 아닌가 합니다.
여기저기 돌아다녀보다보니까.. (베팍은 아니고) 이번 판결은 표준특허를 개발하는 노력을 무시하는 처사다 이제 모든 기업들이 특허를 표준화하려고 노력하지 않고 독점하려고 할 것이다 라는 반응이 유독 많던데. 많이 생뚱맞은 반응이죠 표준화된 통신특허의 대부분은 표준으로 인정받지 못하면 아예 가치가 없어지는 것인데... 자기 특허를 표준에 많이 낑겨넣을수록 유리한 것이 변함없을거란 건 이번 판결과는 전혀 무관한 사실로 계속 남을 겁니다.
